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Abstract
As biometrics are gaining popularity, there is increased
concern over the loss of privacy and potential misuse of bio-
metric data held in central repositories. The association of
fingerprints with criminals raises further concerns. On the
other hand, the alternative suggestion of keeping biomet-
ric data in smart cards does not solve the problem, since
forgers can always claim that their card is broken to avoid
biometric verification altogether.
We propose a biometric authentication framework which
uses two separate biometric features, combined to obtain a
non-unique identifier of the individual, in order to address
privacy concerns. As a particular example, we demonstrate
a fingerprint verification system that uses two separate fin-
gerprints of the same individual. A combined biometric
ID composed of two fingerprints is stored in the central
database, and imprints from both fingers are required in the
verification process, lowering the risk of misuse and pri-
vacy loss. We demonstrate the performance of the proposed
method on a small fingerprint database collected from 95
people.
1. Introduction
Biometric data is increasingly used in authentication and
identification of individuals, replacing password-based se-
curity systems. Identification and authentication refers to
two different tasks: finding the identity of a person given the
biometric versus verifying the identity given the biometric
data and the claimed identity.
There are two approaches to a biometric authentication
system. In one alternative, enrolled users’ biometric data
are kept at a central repository and authentication is done
by verifying the test data against the reference at the central
repository. In the second alternative, a user carries a smart
card containing his/her biometric data, and verification is
done against the sample in the smart card. There are dis-
advantages associated with both of these two approaches.
In particular there is increased concern over the loss of pri-
vacy and potential misuse of biometric data held in central
repositories. Biometric data which can uniquely identify
a person (e.g. fingerprints, iris patterns) can be used to
track individuals, linking many separate databases (where
the person has been, what he has purchased etc.). There
is also fear that the central databases can be used for unin-
tended purposes [2]. For instance, latent fingerprints can be
used to search for information about a person in a central
database, if such databases are compromised. The associ-
ation of fingerprints with criminals raise further concerns
for fingerprint databases in particular. Similarly, biomet-
ric data may reveal certain rare health problems, which may
brings concern about possible discriminatory uses of central
databases.
On the other hand, keeping biometric data in smart cards
has its own disadvantages. In particular, forgers can claim
that their card is broken and avoid biometric verification
altogether. Since a smart card may become damaged le-
gitimately, such a situation would need to be solved by
non-biometric authentication or by resorting to a central
database.
Tomko proposes the use of biometric data as an encryp-
tion key that would be used to encrypt/decrypt his/her PIN
number (of which there can be many) [2,3]. In this way, the
fingerprint which uniquely identifies the person is not stored
in the database, eliminating any privacy concerns. Indeed,
this would be a good solution, however obtaining a unique
encryption key from a biometric data, such as a fingerprint,
is a challenge. Each impression of a fingerprint for instance
is slightly different from another, due to many factors, cut
marks, moisture, finger being pressed differently etc., mak-
ing the task of key generation less than straightforward.
There are very few published research articles on the
topic of privacy within the context of biometrics [1–4];
however public disapproval of the biometric technologies
are increasing in many countries due to the threat of loss of
privacy. In this paper we propose a biometric authentication
framework to address these privacy concerns. In particular,
two biometric features (e.g. fingerprints) are combined to
obtain a non-unique identifier of the individual and stored
as such in a central database. While the combined biometric
ID is not a unique identifier, relieving concerns of privacy,
we show that it can still be used in authenticating a person’s
identity. As a particular example, we demonstrate a finger-
print verification system that uses two separate fingerprints
of the same individual to form a combined biometric ID.
With the proposed method, a person can give two finger-
prints for one application (e.g., passport application), and
two other fingerprints for another one (e.g., bank), creating
two separate biometric IDs. While the person can still be
authenticated for either application, it is impossible to link
the two databases. Similarly, it would be more difficult in
this case to use latent fingerprints to search for a person, as
one would need to try many such combinations of finger-
print pairs.
2. Proposed Method
Each person who enrolls into the system gives two fin-
gerprints, A and B. The minutiae points of these two fin-
gerprints are found and superimposed so that their center of
mass are aligned. The obtained combined minutiae list be-
comes the biometric ID of the person and is stored in the
central database. Note that the combined ID can be gener-
ated by many different fingerprint pairs, as such, it is not a
unique identifier of the person.
The enrollment process is shown in Fig. 1, with the com-
bined minutiae image being on the right. Note that in this
figure we show the two parts of the combined fingerprint
with separate markers for clarity; in fact they should all
be marked the same, since they are indistinguishable in the
combined list.
Figure 1. The combined fingerprint minutiae
on the right is what is stored at the cen-
tral database. The source finger of minutiae
points are actually lost; they are marked here
with special shapes for clarity.
When a person is to be authenticated, s/he gives two fin-
gerprint impressions (A′ and B′), both of which is used to
verify his/her identity. First, one of the fingerprints, say A′,
is matched against the combined biometric ID, as shown
Figure 2. The combined minutiae list is on the
left. The registration of the first fingerprintA′,
shown in blue circles, against the combined
fingerprint is shown on the right. Circles and
squares are used here for clarity. The corre-
sponding fingerprints are shown in Fig. 3.
in Fig. 2. Note that even though the minutiae points are
marked so as to indicate their source finger, they are not kept
in the combined ID. The matching is done by finding the
correspondence between the minutiae of the fingerprint and
the combined minutiae list. Both the minutiae extraction
and the point correspondence algorithm are non-essential to
the proposed method and any previously developed minu-
tiae detection or correspondence algorithms can be used.
After this first match step, the matched minutiae points
are removed from the combined minutiae list, giving
AM +BM −A′M
whereAM indicates the minutiae list of the fingerprintA, +
indicates concatenation and− indicates deletion of matched
points. Then, the second fingerprint B′ is matched against
these remaining minutiae points. The person is authenti-
cated if the ratio of matched minutiae points to the remain-
ing minutiae points left from the combined list plus those
from B′ is above a certain threshold:
score = 2×
∣∣(AM +BM −A′M ) ∩B′M ∣∣∣∣(AM +BM −A′M ) +B′M ∣∣ (1)
In case A′ matches A perfectly and B′ matches B per-
fectly, the resulting score with this metric is 100. If A′ was
not successfully matched, it would be reflected in the final
score since many minutiae points would be left unmatched,
making the denominator large. If B′ was not successfully
matched, the numerator would be small.
Note that the match rate obtained in the first step is sig-
nificantly higher than if we just matched the corresponding
fingerprintsA andA′, since the combined ID contains about
twice as many minutiae points. In particular, fingerprints
with few minutiae points match to several combined finger-
prints with large sets of minutiae points. This makes it very
difficult to search the combined database using a single fin-
gerprint to find matching records (identification), which is
the intended result. On the other hand, it does not reduce the
effectiveness of the system: if minutiae from B are matched
by A′, it will show in the final score if it matters. If on the
other hand A’s and B’s minutiae are nearby, then it does not
matter whose minutiae are matched.
2.1. Experiments
We have demonstrated the concept of a combined bio-
metric ID using fingerprints. Four fingerprints (two from
one finger and two from another finger) are collected from
each of the 96 people contributing to the database. Two of
these fingerprints, one from each finger, are added to the
reference set: they are used to form the combined ID for the
person. The remaining two fingerprints, the second impres-
sions of each finger, are added to the test set: they are used
to authenticate the person.
Figure 3 shows a quadruple from the database: the top
row is the reference set (A and B) and the bottom row is the
test set (A′ and B′), from left to right. Notice that the fin-
gerprints have many missed minutiae, either due to labeling
mistakes, or due to the shifts and deformations in the taking
of the imprints.
Once the data is collected, the minutiae points are found
and matching of the fingerprint pairs are done against the
stored combined fingerprint, as explained in the previous
section. In this work, the minutiae points are marked manu-
ally, but the matching is done automatically. However, note
that manual labelling of the minutiae points is not essential:
any reasonably successful minutiae detection and matching
algorithm can be used. The automatic matching is done
via a simple matching algorithm that aligned two point sets
by finding the best alignment over all translations and rota-
tions, allowing for some elastic deformation of the finger-
print (accepting two points as matching if they are within
a small threshold in this alignment). Since the aim of this
paper was to introduce the idea of a combined biometric ID,
we only needed to show that the resulting combined ID is
non-unique, but that it can still be used to authenticate a per-
son. Hence, minutiae detection and matching were assumed
to be given or were simply implemented.
Using the proposed method explained in Section 2 and
the collected data, there was a 2.1% false accept rate (FRR).
In other words, 2 out of 96 people in the database were
not authorized using their second set of fingerprints (A′ and
B′). On the other hand when each of these fingerprint pairs
were used as a forgery for all other people (for a total of
9120=96*95 data points), only 2.1% were falsely accepted
(FAR). The 2.1% point is the equal error rate (EER) where
Figure 3. Sample quadruple fingerprints from
the database. Top row shows fingerprints A
and B; bottom row shows fingerprints A′ and
B′, left to right.
FAR and FRR, which are inversely proportional, are equal.
In order to test how much error is introduced to the au-
thentication scheme, by the use of two fingerprints instead
of one, we have calculated the error rate of matching the
fingerprints one by one, using the same minutiae detection
and matching algorithms. The matching score used was the
ratio of the number of matching points over the total num-
ber of points in the matched and the reference fingerprints.
For instance, for the A set, it was:
score = 2×
∣∣AM ∩A′M ∣∣∣∣AM +A′M ∣∣ (2)
In this task, the FRR was found to be 3.1%: in other
words, only 6 fingerprints were falsely rejected out of 192
fingerprints (96x2). When each fingerprint was used as
forgery for all the others, the FAR for this test was 2%.
Hence, the combined biometric scheme introduced no adi-
tional errors, in fact, it reduced the error rate. This should in
fact be the case, since we are given more identifying infor-
mation about the person, however the test have shown that
the proposed combination scheme did not hinder verifica-
tion.
The thresholds to decide where to authorize a fingerprint
or fingerprints were set on the test set, for both tasks, in or-
Figure 4. The combined minutiae from 3 dif-
ferent people.
der to give the EER. Since FAR and FRR are inversely pro-
portional, this is a common practice and does not introduce
undue advantage.
Most of the errors were due to fingerprints that had sig-
nificant stretching between two instance, as these are not
well matched using our simple matching algorithm. Other
biggest source of error is fingerprints that have missing left
or right parts, due to pressure being applied to one side of
the finger while taking the imprint.
2.2. Summary and Conclusions
We have introduced the idea of combining biometrics
such that the combined biometric would not be a unique
identifier of the person, yet it could still be successfully used
for authentication purposes.
We have demonstrated such a system using fingerprints
and showed that the authentication error rate is very small
(2.1% EER), even with very simple underlying algorithms
for minutiae detection and matching. Given that there was
actually a decrease in the verification error using the com-
bined biometric, compared to our simple fingerprint verifi-
cation system (labelled minutiae and simple alignment), we
can say that the proposed scheme can be used to increase
privacy without hindering the verification process.
We have not actually proven that the combined biomet-
ric cannot be used to track a person: it may be possi-
ble that a certain pattern of minutiae distribution appears
only for a given person. However, the addition of minutiae
points from the second fingerprint hides these patterns to
the largest extent. In the future, one can further look into
how to best combine two biometrics, (e.g. to disperse the
minutiae points as much as possible etc.) so as to hide most
unique features of a fingerprint. Three separate combined
fingerprint minutiae are shown in Fig. 4 to give some idea.
We have collected our own data because we wanted to
make sure to have four fingerprints from each user and to
have relatively good fingerprints. In future, we will try the
same tests with public fingerprint databases, as well as more
sophisticated minutiae detection and matching algorithms.
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